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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALVAN STRASRYPKA and KAREN
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COMES NOW the PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS hereinafter "Plaintiffs"
and submit the following REPLY BRIEF in the above captioned case:

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT
HAD BREACHED THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY
FEES THEREBY.
A.

Pursuant to the uniform real estate
contract
between
the
parties,
the
Plaintiffs had an absolute right to declare
acceleration of the contract.

Defendant, Westport Funding Co. continues to maintain
that Plaintiffs breached the uniform real estate contract by
declaring acceleration of said contract, citing Home Owner Loan
Corp. v. Washington. 161 P.2d 355, 358 (Utah 1945).

However,

notwithstanding the purported applicability of that case, the
express language of the contract expressly prescribed the actions
1

ultimately taken by the Plaintiffs.

Specifically, the contract

explicitly provides that:
16. In the event of failure to comply with
the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure
of the Buyer to make any payment or payments
when the same shall become due, or within
thirty (3) days thereafter, the Seller, at his
option shall have the following alternative
remedies:
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his
option, and upon written notice to the
Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance
hereunder at once due and payable, and may
elect to treat this contract as a note and
mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer
subject thereto, and proceed immediately to
foreclose the same in accordance with the
laws of the State of Utah, and have the
property sold and the proceeds applied to
the payment of the balance owing including
costs and attorney fees; and the Seller may
have a judgment for any deficiency which
may remain. In the case of foreclosure,
the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a
complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take
possession of said mortgaged property and
collect the rents, issue any profits
therefrom and apply the same to the payment
of the obligation hereunder, or hold the
same pursuant to the order of the court;
and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of
foreclosure, shall be entitled to the
possession of the said premises during the
period of redemption.
In the instant case, it is uncontroverted that the
Plaintiffs did not receive the January 1991 payment until after
February 15, thus constituting a default under the contract.
fact, the court even noted:
2

In

Now, I have indicated even though in the
best light to the defendant, if tender were as
I have indicated is my holding, if the payments
were tendered, they were still late. But does
that
constitute
a
breach
under
these
circumstances where acceleration could then be
justified pursuant to the uniform real estate
contract as evidenced by P-l? Mr Wilson, as he
correctly stated many times, that forfeiture
then becomes a question of equity. And it is
my opinion that equity would forbid me from
allowing the acceleration of this contract
based upon questionable $95 missed payments.
Even though they were, as I indicated tendered,
but late, they were late only on the February
payment— excuse me, on the January payment.
They were late only by one or two days.
Transcript of Ruling 10-11.
Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs complied with the express
terms of the agreement between the parties with respect to
acceleration, they could not possibly have breached the agreement.
Accordingly, the District Court erred in concluding that their
declaration of acceleration and attempted foreclosure was a breach
of the contract.
II. THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE JANUARY 1, 1991 CHECK WAS FOR THE
PAYMENT THAT WAS DUE DECEMBER 15, 1990.
Defendant, Westport Funding, cross appeals, claiming the
trial court erred in finding that the January 1, 1991 check was
for the payment that was due on December 15, 1990. In so arguing,
Defendant smugly claims that it has marshalled all the evidence in
support of the finding and that such evidence is insufficient to
3

support the finding, citing Cove View Excavating & Const, s.
Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1988).

However, certain

evidence is conspicuously absent in the Defendant's marshalling
effort.

Particularly, the Defendant

fails to note

certain

testimony evidence of Mr. Strasrypka which would, in and of
itself, be sufficient to support the trial court's finding.
Specifically, Mr. Strasrypka testified that he had personal
knowledge that the payments from Clella Glazier were consistently
late.

His testimony was as follows:
Q. [By Ms. Van Frank]: It is my understanding
that it is your position that Mrs. Glazier has been
late from the very first payment she ever made to
your father, is that correct?
A.

That's correct

Q.
Your father had the dealing with Mrs.
Glazier when she took over the property; is that
correct?
A.

Yes, I believe so.

Q. You didn't have dealings with mrs. Glazier,
is that correct?
A. No.
Q.
And your knowledge of your father's
dealings with Mrs. Glazier came directly from your
father; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q. You weren't there when the property was is
that correct?
A.

That is correct.
4

Q.
And so your alleyway source of getting
information about whether or not she was late or
early or otherwise in her payments was your father,
right?
A.

Yes

Q. The basis of your personal knowledge as to
whether or not [Mrs. Glazier] was early or late, is
your records, that's what you testified to earlier;
isn't that correct?

Q. On page 2 on page 32 [of Mr. Strasrypka's
deposition] excuse me. At line 2 on page 32 I have
asked you the question, "Have you found any bank
records of your own to reconstruct payment dates
from Mrs. Glazier?" and your response was, no, you
hadn't found any payments or any records of your
own. And then I asked you if you found any bank
records of your father's, and your answer was, no,
these checks were cashed immediately.
A. Yes.
Q. You have no records— you have no records.
You have only the checks that you recall receiving
on the first of the month for more than ten years;
isn't that correct?
A. Yes.

Following, such testimony, Ms. Van Frank moved the court
to strike Mr. Strasrypka's evidence based on the same objection
she raises before this court on appeal. However, the court denied
such motion, ruling:
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[By the court]: Generally—well, the motion to
strike is denied. As the fact finding, I'm able to
distinguish as to what those events which he has
personal knowledge of, those that he is basing it on
objective testimony.
the motion to strike is
overruled.
I will be able to decide how to
reconcile any apparent conflict.
R. 42.
Based on the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that the
Plaintiff, Mr. Strasrypka, had personal knowledge, independent of
any

records

or

other

documentation,

that

consistently late in making her payments.

Ms.

Glazier

was

The court explicitly

recognized the apparent inconsistency between the Plaintiff's
trial testimony and his deposition testimony and afforded Mr.
Strasrypka's testimony that he had independent knowledge that the
payments were invariably late the appropriate deference. Because,
the Plaintiff's testimony was sufficient to support the court's
ultimate finding that the January 1, 1991 check was for the
payment that was due on December 15, 1990, such finding is not
clearly erroneous.
Additionally, the district court had before it the checks
written by Mrs. Glazier (Exhibit 29) and the amortization schedule
(Exhibit 2) upon which the court could reconstruct the payment
schedule and thereby reconcile any dispute as to when Mrs. Glazier
made her payments under the contract.

Such evidence would

likewise be sufficient to support the court's finding that the
6

January 1, 191 check was for the payment that was due on December
15, 1990.

Accordingly, inasmuch as the Defendant failed to

marshall all of the evidence in support of the court's finding,
this court need not consider the Defendant's challenge to such
finding.

Moreover, if this

court elects to

consider

such

challenge, there was certainly sufficient evidence before the
district court to support the finding.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the
district court's ruling that the Plaintiffs defaulted under the
uniform real estate contract so as to entitle the Defendant to the
award of attorney fees.
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